Nation Branding versus Nation Brand: Anholt and Brand Sweden

These days it’s all about ‘nation branding’, right? Wrong. Although Simon Anholt is credited with the invention of the term ‘nation branding’, he insists the term he actually coined was ‘nation brand’. That is, a nation as a brand. This may be a small distinction to make, but for Anholt it is an important one. In a globalised world, countries depend on reputation as much as companies do. It is their most important asset.

One example of this can be seen in Sweden. Sweden has a powerful, positive reputation. If you’re selling a product that says ‘made in Sweden’ people are automatically willing to pay 20% more for it! As well as this, Sweden benefits from large numbers of tourists yet it is not typically a tourist destination. These may be flippant examples, but they emphasise the main problem of the idea of ‘nation branding’, which is that the term seems to incorporate a promise; the promise that if you do not like your country’s image then you can fix it. Clearly, this is not always the case. (Nation Branding, 2010a)

For example, developing countries spend obscene amounts of money annually on nation branding, yet it fails to change the image of the nation abroad. People usually believe a particular way about a state for two reasons: Firstly, because it is usually true, and secondly, because they have believed that way all of their lives. After looking at the Nations Brand Index it becomes apparent that people do not change their minds about other countries unless they are forced to. Why? Because a) they don’t care, and b) why should they? (Nation Branding, 2010b)

Although there are a number of clichés regarding nation brands; England is posh, Italy is romantic, America is a bully, and so on, these clichés help us to navigate in an increasingly complex and interconnected world. With this in mind, the City Brands Index (Anholt, 2009) turns up some interesting results. Stockholm and Amsterdam are universally regarded as two of the safest cities in the world, even though shortly before the survey took place a murder had been committed in broad daylight in both of those cities. Both the Dutch and the Swedish criticised the survey for being inaccurate, yet when Anholt re-interviewed the participants and prompted them about the murders in these cities, people still did not change their mind and instead merely commented that they were surprised such incidents had happened in such safe cities!

Moreover, the index also found that most people only spend their time thinking about three main countries: Their own country, America, and a third who happens to be in the media most at that point. There are 205 countries in the world, so effectively what this means is that most people forget around 203 of the countries and just think about two nations plus their own. If this is indeed the case, how is ‘nation branding’ ever supposed to succeed?

The problem here is that the search for a good profile has become nonsensical. The Danes were offended because they came 15th in the Nation Brands Index – but does it really matter? In the case of Sweden, they have one of the most positive images on the planet, and are universally admired for being stable, good, prosperous and helpful. This is because all countries have the reputation they deserve. If a country has a rubbish image, perhaps it’s because it’s a rubbish country? In that instance, all the advertising and branding campaigns in the world could not change that image. Communications clearly will not do the job, and so if a country really wants a better image they need to think about their product. Even the idea of talking people into believing a different image is unrealistic. In order to change the reputation, a nation has to change the causes and stimuli that give rise to that reputation (Nation Branding, 2010a).

With regards to Sweden, as well as their positive image Sweden is one of only very few states that have a balanced image on the Nation Brands Index (2010b). Usually, nations will fall into one of two categories: Decorative or Useful. Nations such as Germany are perceived as being useful, whereas nations like Jamaica or Italy are perceived as being decorative. Sweden is perceived as both, as is the UK, and this gives these states an enormous amount of power to achieve things.

Human nature dictates that if someone professes to having a good reputation, even if they were lying in the first place, eventually they will start to relish the reputation and will start to behave in such a way as to ensure that reputation stays. Transferring this to an international level, nations that profess to having a good image will act accordingly in order to keep that image. A good image means you have influence, and so instead of obsessing over it Anholt suggests that those nations use their influence to help other nations. The only real reason one country would think fondly of another is if that country had done something to help them.

Everybody appreciates that Sweden is a great country, but they do not necessarily know what it is for? Should all nations not be asking themselves what they are for instead of what they look like? If you give yourself a point of relevance you give your nation a more important image. You give yourself a brand.

For more information on this matter please watch the video 'Simon Anholt on brand Sweden' available here: http://nation-branding.info/2010/12/25/simon-anholt-on-brand-sweden/

Anholt, S. (2009) The Anholt-GfK Roper City Brands Index 2009. Available at: http://www.simonanholt.com/Research/research-city-brand-index.aspx [Accessed on: 23rd March 2011]

Nation Branding (2010a) Simon Anholt on Brand Sweden. Available at: http://nation-branding.info/2010/12/25/simon-anholt-on-brand-sweden/ [Accessed on: 20th March 2011]

Nation Branding (2010b) Nation Branding Index 2010 released. Available at: http://nation-branding.info/2010/10/13/nation-brands-index-2010/ [Accessed on: 21st March 2011]

The Soviet Union and CD: The forgotten tale of 'low politics' in a 'high politics' era.

One aspect of Cold War diplomacy which is often forgotten about is that of the Soviet Union. Similarly to the United States, the Soviet Union realised the importance of influencing public opinion during this turbulent period and so public and cultural diplomacy became of more and more importance. This blog is going to look at the evolution of Soviet cultural diplomacy, the measures implemented during the Cold War, and the reasons for this.

During the 1920’s, the Soviet Union implemented classic instruments of foreign policy – diplomatic and consular systems. In addition to this, they also founded an entire network of cultural organisations with the purpose of attracting members of intellectual professions and the progressive bourgeoisie from the West. In contrast to political propaganda, this cultural diplomacy was intended not to arouse radical vocations, but instead was aimed at the propagation of a positive and controlled image of Soviet life. This cultural diplomacy was known for its cultural initiatives and excellent protagonists through avant-garde artists, writers and scholars. It became one of the most effective instruments in the history of Soviet foreign policy.

Although the Stalinist period was characterised by state propaganda, in 1955, two years after Stalin’s death, the Soviet All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) stated that the year had marked the revival of Soviet-American cultural exchanges. This year saw an increase in the number of Americans visiting the Soviet Union as well as several mutual exchanges of delegations. This revival process led to the realisation that traditional propaganda strategies were not working in the US, and ultimately led to the signing of a cultural agreement between the two states in 1958 (Gienhow-Hecht and Donfried, 2010. pp.33-49).

During this period of revival, Soviet delegations in the United States saw positive treatment and positive media coverage. VOKS representatives attributed this response to their increased interaction with the Americans, as well as to improvements to the informational materials about the Soviet Union available to American people. Delegations were met with warmth and hospitality and found great sympathy among ‘ordinary Americans’ towards both the Soviet country and people. As well as this, both Soviet and American media gave considerable coverage to the visits, and the rekindled energy of Soviet-American cultural relations could be seen in the tangible optimism on all levels. But this was not just about sightseeing for the Soviets, the delegations strove at all times to promote and explain the Soviet point of view (Gienhow-Hecht and Donfried, 2010. pp.50-69).

‘The perceived success of 1955 was considerable and slowly, some kind of rethinking the system of propaganda about American topics was taking place’ (Gienhow-Hecht and Donfried, 2010). During this time the obstacles presented by the US, i.e. McCarthyism, were becoming less of an issue and there appeared to be an increased interest in Soviet life. The Soviet authorities slowly realised that it was difficult for their delegates to balance their information gathering whilst simultaneously expecting them to criticise the US, and so eventually realised the need to update and modernise their cultural policies. What is important to note about this development is that although the distinction between propaganda and public and cultural diplomacy is, at times, a fine one, it is important that it is made. As well as this, it shows the importance of cultural diplomacy specifically as an effective instrument of a state’s foreign policy; One that should certainly not be forgotten.

Gienow_Hecht, J. C. E. and Donfried, M. C. (2010) Searching For A Cultural Diplomacy. United States: Berghahn Books. pp.33-74.

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The European Union is in a great position for the practice of ‘soft power’ to try to attract through its founding principles, and influence the world on its own vision. (La Porte, T. 2011) The problem is that the EU has not really concentrated efforts as a whole on public diplomacy, but all member states individually have their own public diplomacy programs and present a diverse message of the EU. Even though EU’s image in the world is hugely positive, it still lacks a coherent message as a whole, agreed upon by member states, and therefore a consistently communicated message. (Missiroli, A. 2005) The EU, because of its diverse membership of nations, presents itself to the world as having ‘unity in diversity’, but yet lacks a unified approach to public diplomacy, even though the potential of the EU for its own specific public diplomacy could be endless due to its co-operative character. The EU therefore needs to acknowledge the need for a unified approach in order to be able to realize its full potential on the international arena. (Fiske De Gouveia, P. & Plumridge, H. 2005)

In order to further one’s national interests, governments usually conduct public diplomacy, and EU member states are no different as they continuously individually conduct their own public diplomacy to further their national interests. Even though the EU is built on co-operation in different areas, public diplomacy is one area that seems to have been left behind. (Fiske De Gouveia, P. & Plumridge, H. 2005) The issue with not co-operating more closely together in the area of public diplomacy, means that public diplomacy conducted by member states individually might consist of completely different messages of the EU and therefore cancel each other out. The suggestions therefore aren’t that member states should completely abandon their own public diplomacy campaigns, but rather increase co-operation in this area to get the most out of them and produce a unified front. (Ibid.) More emphasis on EU’s own specific public diplomacy is essential especially when dealing with countries outside of Europe. As a matter of fact, even inside the EU, its own citizens are often confused about the EU and the way it functions, so how could the people outside the EU know or understand its role and institutions, what matters and what the EU stands for. Better common and coherent EU public diplomacy could therefore not only be good to promote the EU outside of Europe, but also to build up a better understanding of it inside its own borders. (Ibid.)

The EU is engaged in many projects trying to project its image and information on its institutions in countries outside of Europe, but this is more of an information campaign rather than public diplomacy. (La Porte, T. 2009) This is all well and good, but for the EU to truly realize its potential and effectively work in the international arena, to influence and attract, it needs to gather member states and create a consistent and coherent message to portray, and enhance co-operation in the area of public diplomacy campaigns of member states to ensure that the EU message is clear. “The US makes offers we cannot refuse; the EU makes offers we cannot understand!”, was stated by a Middle Eastern Diplomat. (Lynch, D. 2005)

References:

- Fiske De Gouveia, Philip & Plumridge, Hester (2005) European Infopolitik: Developing EU Public Diplomacy Strategy. The Foreign Policy Center. Available from: http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/657.pdf Accessed: 22.3.2011

- La Porte, Teresa (2009) The Public Diplomacy of the EU. USC Center on Public Diplomacy, September 24. Available from: http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/events/events_detail/7287/ Accessed: 22.3.2011

- La Porte, Teresa (2011) The Power of the European Union in Global Governance: A proposal for a New Public Diplomacy. Los Angeles: Figueroa Press. Available from: http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/publications/perspectives/CPDPerspectivesEUPower.pdf Accessed: 23.3.2011

- Lynch, Dov (2005) Communicating Europe to the World: What Public Diplomacy for the EU? European Policy Center, Working Paper No. 21. Available from: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?fecvnodeid=110616&ord588=grp1&fecvid=33&ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&v33=110616&id=16968 Accessed: 22.3.2011

- Missiroli, Antonio. Stand and Deliver: The European Message Abroad from Lynch, Dov (2005) Communicating Europe to the World: What Public Diplomacy for the EU? European Policy Center, Working Paper No. 21. Available from: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?fecvnodeid=110616&ord588=grp1&fecvid=33&ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&v33=110616&id=16968 Accessed: 22.3.2011

QATAR- a shining star on the stage of Public Diplomacy

In the international diplomatic arena, the small state of Qatar has emerged as a shining star. As unpredictable as it seems, this Emirate is now a diplomatic actor to count on. How is this possible you may ask? How can such a small state have any leverage or hold any weight within the international community? What makes Qatar different from Bahrain or the United Arab Emirates? Let me take you on the journey of Qatari Diplomacy.

It is true that Qatar share many similarities with its immediate neighbours. Qatar hosts a significant number of guest workers in relation to its own small native population on a relatively small territory. In addition, it is an emirate and is rich in both oil and gas. However, unlike its neighbours on the initiative by Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani Qatar has pursued a very specific form of Public Diplomacy – namely Niche Diplomacy.

Niche Diplomacy can be defined as the concentration of “resources in specific areas best able to generate returns worth having” (Ungerer, 2007, p.548). Put differently, by selectively focusing efforts in one area, often for the greater good of the international community, states gain influence in international relations that is disproportionate to their size and role in the wider international community. As such, it allows small states to overcome the difficulty of yielding influence. In the case of Qatar, niche diplomacy is employed for two reasons. First, it is a calculated effort to achieve more influence on an international scale by gaining international recognition. Second, it is a survival mechanism in an unstable region with two competing powers – Saudi Arabia and Iran. (Rockower,2008)

So what is Qatar’s niche diplomacy? Conflict mediation. Yes, Qatar has proven to be a skillful mediator. Its niche diplomacy success rests primarily on three elements. First, the Emir has placed Qatar in a unique position by cultivating close ties to many diverse states and actors, often at odds with one another. While hosting an American military base and maintaining a close friendship to the US, Qatar has intimate relations with Iran. Furthermore, despite being a key supporter of Hamas, Qatar has informal ties to Israel. Qatar convenes continuous meetings with Hamas officials within its territory while simultaneously pushing for the Middle East to develop economic ties with Israel. (Cooper and Momani 2010)

Second, Qatar is perceived as honest and independent, free from the dominance of major regional and global players. This in part due to its close ties to a wide variety of actors as well as its boldness to speak out. Qatar has opposed economic sanctions of Israel, but also chose to expel Israel’s trade commission in Doha after the bombardments of Lebanon in 2006. Furthermore, it is also attributed to Qatar’s mere size- by definition as a small state Qatar is not viewed as a potential threat to others. (Abraham,2008 and Rockower,2008)

Third, as a result of its oil and gas resources, Qatar has the ability to influence mediation efforts by the use of financial means. For example Qatar invites different parties to a conflict (including what it is seen as the rebel” side) to Doha for negotiations- all expenses paid by Qatar. Furthermore, Qatar also engages in humanitarian and reconstruction efforts where large donations are made. Such generosity endows Qatar with both access and credibility. Thus, this form of “checkbook diplomacy” is often employed to back up mediation efforts pursued by Qatar. (Reuters,2010 and Rockower,2008)

Having had a mediator role in many conflicts including Yemen, Darfur, Western Sahara and within the Palestinian factions, Qatar had its breakthrough with Lebanon in 2008. At the time Lebanon was on the brink of a civil war because of the inability of various factions to agree on the choice of President. After 18 months of political deadlock where the US, France, Saudi Arabia and the Arab League had all attempted to mediate the conflict it was Qatar that saved Lebanon from yet another devastating civil war. Since the other mediators had a perceived bias towards various factions they were unable to gain the trust of all. Only Qatar, with recognised links to all of the parties involved was able to bring the Lebanese factions together. (Cooper and Momani, 2010 and Janardhan,2010)

In conclusion, Qatar has succeeded in its role as a mediator because it is perceived as honest and trustworthy, it has strong ties to antithetical actors and is able to back up any mediation efforts with its checkbook diplomacy. As a result, Qatar has become much more than just another oil-rich emirate in the Arabian-peninsula. Qatar has gained influence in the realms of the international diplomatic scene- and rightly so.

SOURCES:

Abraham, George(2008), “Qatar is a diplomatic heavy-hitter”, Al Jazeera, July 1, http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2008/07/200872164735567644.html

Cooper, Andrew F and Momani, Bessma(2010), “Qatar and expanded contours of Small State Diplomacy”, February, http://www.arts.uwaterloo.ca/~bmomani/documents/ISA2010-Qatar.pdf

Janardhan, Dr N.(2010), “Niche diplomacy gets Qatar to its goal”, The Khaleej Times, December 30, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=/data/opinion/2010/December/opinion_December142.xml&section=opinion

Reuters(2010), “Wealthy Qatar tries to build niche as conflict mediator”, al-Masrya al-Youm, June 4, http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/46676

Rockower,Paul(2008), “Qatar’s Public Diplomacy”, December 12

Ungerer,Carl(2007), “The ‘Middle Power’ Concept in Australian Foreign Policy”, The Journal of Politics and History, vol.53,nr.4,p.538-551