Public Cultural Diplomacy after 9/11: A Failure

After 9/11 U.S. Public Cultural Diplomacy may be accepted disappointing from several aspects. Although the channels of communication were accelerated but as critics argued that there are several problems with the public policy. Now United States has a new enemy: extreme Islamists. But although United States was a victim of 9/11, United States continue to have a negative image in the globe. The reason of that negative image further supported with Wikileaks scandal. International arena has negative towards United States. United States tries to explain her motives by emphasizing on 9/11 whereas she loses thrust with American popular culture, operation to Iraq and so on. Statistics show that there are other reasons of the failure with regard to public cultural policy:

1) USAID scholarship for foreign students declined from 20.000 to 900

2) Funding for cultural exchange programs declined

3) There is no a contra opinion in the State Department, i.e. no Muslim staff

So what can be done? United States should make cultural exports in order to change the perception of United States in Middle East. During Cold War United States used to be perceived as the representative of freedom but today she is perceived as an imperialist enemy. United States shouldchange that perception otherwise she will continue to suffer from negative attitude.

Bibliography

Ivey, B. and Cleggett, P. “Cultural Diplomacy and the National Interest: In a Search of 21st Century Perspective”. The Curb Center For Art. http://www.interarts.net/descargas/interarts673.pdf

ROLE OF NATIONAL EMBASSY WEBSITES IN CULTURAL & PUBLIC DIPLOMACY NORWEGIAN vs. CANADIAN EMBASSIES IN LONDON

ROLE OF NATIONAL EMBASSY WEBSITES IN CULTURAL & PUBLIC  DIPLOMACY  

NORWEGIAN vs. CANADIAN EMBASSIES IN LONDON

Cultural and public diplomacy (CPD) is about all to inform and influence foreign publics in the best interests of the nation state and  CPD  activities can be classified into 5 categories: listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy , exchange diplomacy and international broadcasting.

Both Norway and Canada are relatively small powers in the public diplomacy arena. Desire to be noticed and for the right reasons is one of Jan Melissens crucial point for small and middle powers and this is done by embassies and their websites. Working with limited resources is another important factor. Or even relying on ingenuity and networking which some great powers lack which can lead to coalition building.

This form of speciality is what is known as niche diplomacy. Niche diplomacy involves concentrating resources in specific areas best able to generate returns worth having, in these regards , the embassies.

Norway’s situation is one of central diplomacy. It is not a recognized. That being said , there is a clear issue of lack of recognized identity. How does Norway play into the public diplomacy field with help from the embassy website ?

The Norwegian embassy website in London points out categorically that the Embassy's main function is to promote Norwegian interests in the United Kingdom and further develop Norwegian-British relations. It talks about what each embassy section does including, the political/economic section, consular section, and press/information and cultural section as well as the commercial/tourism section .It gives names and email / telephone contacts of responsible officers. It talks also about the role and contribution of Norway in the UN with special emphasis on poverty reduction worldwide, its contribution in the areas of democracy and human rights as well as world peace. The website invites subscription to the Norwegian embassy newsletter.

Norway’s reputation for public diplomacy via the embassy is largely along the lines of international aid. Cooperation with the Red Cross and peace agencies. Norway is also renown for the Nobel Peace Prize, which plays some significance depending on how it is perceived in the international scene.

Canada on the other hand is rather different . It is relatively more known than Norway for its Public Diplomacy. The Canadian (High Commission) embassy website in London ( which is bi-lingual : English/French ) features a lot of information about the visa/immigration, studying in Canada, doing business in Canada and about Canada itself. It talks a lot about the UK-Canada bilateral relations in various areas including economic , political , defence and security, as well as academic and cultural . It also gives information about the Canada- EU relations.

Canada has a more open approach to how it tackles cultural diplomacy. They use Nicholas Culls one of the five tools of diplomacy and that’s advocacy. Both Canada and Norway tackle issues of human security.

Report Review: US State Department’s Annual Report on Tibet Negotiations, March 2009 – February 2010 (http://tibet.net/en/pdf/usaTibetReport2010.pdf)

A brief overview of the China-Tibet conflict is directly related to China’s claim that Tibet is a part of China. The Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) representatives indicate that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) suppress the Tibetan people’s religious, linguistic and traditional heritage. The US State Department’s report is focused upon official relations between China and Tibet, indicating that the US recognises Tibet as the TAR of China and acknowledges that the Dalai Lama is not pursuing state sovereignty or independence and is instead seeking to retain cultural, linguistic and religious traditions that make up the Tibetan lifestyle. The report outlines that US foreign policy is to focus on the encouragement of “substantive dialogue” between the PRC and FAC, believing progressive relations to have an overall stabilising effect for China and that China’s failure to respond in an appropriate manner is likely to lead to future problems, both internally and externally, that may hinder “social and economic development”. The US indicate that they do not engage in direct diplomatic relations with the Dalai Lama as Tibet is not an independent state but they do have relations through political and non-political groups, with President Obama and Secretary of State Hilary Clinton meeting with the Dalai Lama in February 2010 as a “religious leader”. The Dalai Lama is not referred to as the leader of Tibet, but rather as a voice of the Tibetan people and a reflection of their views and desires. The Dalai Lama’s White House visit on 18 February 2010 saw praise given to his “Middle Way” approach, with Obama reinstating support for the Tibetan people and their unique way of life. China is said to have urged the US not to meet with the Dalai Lama at this time and is subsequently criticised for exercising a negative rhetoric toward the Tibetan religious leader. This, along with a statement outlining China’s continued repression of Tibetan religious freedoms in 2009 are the only time criticisms of this type are made toward the PRC. The report outlines China’s need to uphold human rights, to recognise religious and ethnic minority groups within China (with Tibet a specific focus in this aspect) and also consistently emphasises the need for continued dialogue between the PRC and TAR.

US Ambassador-designate to China, Jon Huntsman, is given as advocating for human rights and dialogue at the US Embassy in Beijing and US Consulate General in Chengdu, aimed at Chinese officials and US officials are permitted to travel from China to Tibet to monitor the situation, reporting limited access to some areas in Tibet. Although this is state-led, it represents efforts of the PRC to work with US officials and potentially improving their public image abroad. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) recently announced the government’s approval of private visits to China of Tibetan “compatriots”, although the Dalai Lama himself was excluded from entering China until such a time as he publically announces Tibet as a part of the PRC. While the report highlights the government permission of US officials and Tibetan representatives into other areas of the TAR for monitoring purposes, it makes no clear indication of findings or evidence to support or deny claims of Tibetan cultural suppression. 2002 saw the Dalai Lama’s brother visiting China as a representative of the TAR, with the report indicating that after 17 years of continual tension, was hoped to ensue a significant improvement in relations, however, the outbreak of protests and riots in Tibet in 2008 disproved such notions. China is given as suggesting that such protests were aimed at diminishing their Beijing Olympic efforts. The report states that the PRC perceive Tibet’s engagement with international organisations as an expression of separatist tendencies, even when undertaken within a peace-building capacity as illustrated by the Dalai Lama’s involvement with the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (www.imtd.org 2011).

Overall the report consistently cites dialogue between the PRC and TAR as a key tool for moving forward, while at the same time refusing to acknowledge the Dalai Lama or affiliated officials as a government-in-exile. This can be seen to perpetuate China’s claim toward Tibet, along with Taiwan, as being part of China and the PRC subsequently refuse to engage in talks that suggest otherwise. The US talks with the Dalai Lama (as a ‘religious leader’) ultimately encourage his current “Middle Way” approach whereby Tibet is accepted as a Chinese autonomous region, although the Dalai Lama urges for “genuine autonomy that will enable the Tibetan people to govern themselves in accordance with their own needs”, something which the PRC has been reluctant to do so far and hence the 50 year stalemate between the two sides. While the PRC has made token-gestures to promote the Tibetan lifestyle and livelihood, it does so within a restrictive state-led strategy that places China’s economic and social prosperity above that of the Tibetan’s. In March 2011 China published a ‘manual on Tibet’ which is aimed at offering basic information about Tibet, although the publication was not available from the Chinese Government’s official website (www.gov.cn 2011). The US report, while illustrating historic and continual tensions between the PRC and TAR, appears to skirt-over many of the more pressing issues such as economic development, environmental degradation, human rights abuses and progressive steps to ensure the retention of the Tibetan way of life. The report instead, consistently urges for dialogue between the two sides, as well as stating that whenever US officials have the opportunity, they will publically call for China to engage in dialogue with Tibet and respect minority rights. The report lacks adequate evidence, solutions or suggestions of an alternative approach that would see future progressive developments and appears to condone China’s position toward Tibet, while at the same time offering its sympathies to the Tibetan people. In this manner, the report adopts an observatory role and can be seen to offer very little in relation to public and cultural diplomacy efforts of either side. Having said this, it can perhaps be argued that as the Dalai Lama is not considered an official government representative, only a religious leader, that all of China’s activities in relation to the TAR are undertaken within a cultural diplomacy manner as they are working toward, albeit not very successfully, cultural understanding and engagement with Tibet.

Sources:

·Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal, ‘China Publishes Manual on Tibet’, available as of 14 April 2011 at http://www.gov.cn/english/2011-03/22/content_1829276.htm

·The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy: Peacebuilding through Collaboration, ‘Country Project: Tibetan Government and Community in Exile’, available as of 13 April 2011 at http://www.imtd.org/country-projects/government-of-tibet-in-exile/

China’s soft power strategy

China is given as transitioning through various forms of public and cultural diplomacy efforts, with the latest evident within a soft power capacity as illustrated by Joseph Nye’s works. Nye indicates that “threats of coercion (“sticks”); inducement or payments (“carrots”) and attraction” make others behave in desirable ways that allow for favourable outcomes for the soft power user (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 2008). While Nye is discussing China’s role within the 2008 Olympics and the subsequent success of the event for China’s global image, he indicates that soft power strategies have allowed for some 110, 000 foreign students to be enrolled in the country, 17 million visiting tourists per year, as well as over 200 Confucius Institutes to be established globally (ibid). Nye also highlights broadcasting efforts whereby China Radio International were now broadcasting in English 24 hours per day, compared to the Voice of America’s reduction in China from 19 to 14 hours daily. Such strategies can be seen to operate within the latter ‘attraction’ of Nye’s three illustrations of soft power, with Kurlantzick (2007) suggesting that Nye focuses on this aspect far more than ‘carrot’ or ‘stick’ methods and which he himself gives greater attention to, perceiving them as a crucial factor in China’s success so far.

Kurlantzick places greater emphasis on China’s use of carrot and stick strategies in developing countries as a means for gaining greater soft power success. In this manner China’s heightened presence in Thailand following the Asian Financial Crisis, when the US are given as largely withdrawing financial support, saw the spread of Chinese studies centres and consulates along with economic ties between China and Thailand. Kurlantzick refers to such practices as China’s ‘charm offensive’, although outlining that very little is actually known about their strategic approach and diplomatic methods, as well as extensive information regarding aid figures and how China’s soft power diplomacy is received by recipient citizens. A 2003 visit of then US President George Bush is said by Kurlantzick to have been received by a hostile public and parliamentary audience due to the American use of hard power in relation to the (then) recent invasion of Iraq. Whereas China’s President Hu Jinato’s subsequent visit is said to have received a warm welcome, with the leader spending longer in the country and the trip finalised by the signing a Free Trade Agreement with Australia, with the first round of negotiations taking place in May 2005 (http://www.dfat.gov.au/ 2011). Australia and China have a history of public and cultural diplomacy as represented by the 1978 introduction of the Australia-China Council (ACC), designed to “promote mutual understanding and foster people-to-people relations” (ibid). The ACC offers grants and funding opportunities for various schemes that are associated with promoting the Council’s aims, operating via institutions or individuals in areas such as education, economics and cultural sharing, including student exchange programs.

China’s inclination toward “coercive economic and diplomatic levers like aid and investment” (Kurlantzick 2007: 6) are seen as outside of the traditional soft power approach, which Nye perceives as geared more toward the promotion of a positive value base, leading to nation-branding attractiveness, and can perhaps be seen in the context of overseas volunteers or academic exchange programs, something in which China is becoming increasingly involved with. In this context China’s soft power approach can be seen to include “anything outside of the military and security realm” (ibid). China is keen to promote an image of a ‘peaceful rise’ as represented by its engagement with the UN and ASEAN to utilise diplomatic measures, with the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties and Treaty of Amity demonstrating the progression from maritime disputes over the South China Sea between China, Vietnam and the Philippines (http://www.clingendael.nl/ 2010). Nye (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 2008) outlines how China carried out regional soft power strategies initially and, with successes in this area, moved its attention globally within a cultural diplomacy context. The “Voyage of Chinese Culture to Africa” and “China-Africa Youth Festival” in 2004, as well as the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) in 2000 can all be given as examples of public and cultural diplomacy with the intent of increasing relations, dialogue and economic ties (http://www.chinese-embassy.org.za/ 2004). China has been keen to market historic exploration to the Middle East, Africa and Asia by Zheng He and Cheng Ho as “encountering but never conquering other nations” (Kurlantzick 2007: 62). China’s more recent involvement in developing countries (especially within Africa) whereby aid is given without restrictions, unlike the imposed conditionality’s of Western aid providers and further perpetuates the ‘peaceful’ image China wishes to portray.

China has, however, come under heavy criticism for its apparent involvement in the supply of arms that helped fuel the 2008 conflict in Darfur, despite a UN arms embargo. The BBC’s Panorama programme reported the use of Chinese supplied tanks and armaments, as well as training given to pilots of Chinese A5 Fantan fighter jets (http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/ 2008). China was said to have not publically responded to the Panorama allegations and had previously spoken of its strong economic ties with Sudan (China is the main purchases of Sudan’s oil) and that the country needed support in the form of business partners, development and peaceful relations with Darfur, instead of “confrontation and sanctions from the West” (ibid). In this manner China’s soft power can be seen to ignore numerous human rights violations, both at home and when dealing with global trading partners and exposes a darker, economically-focused strategy that turns a blind eye to a country’s domestic issues in return for almost exclusive trading rights. In this manner, Nye is keen to outline how the US is still (at the time of the article in 2008) perceived as the dominant soft power user and that China should now focus on “free expression” within the country in order to continue their efforts of global acceptance and legitimacy as a superpower state (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 2008). Nye also indicates that soft power can, and usually is, conducted by both state and non-state actors but that China, with its controlling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), all too often operates at the state level and carefully constructs the image portrayed to the outside world.

It has been noted, however, that the US are mistrusting China’s ability to rise peacefully and some argue that “history and international relations theory shows that tensions and war are often associated with the rise of a new great power” (Jentleson 2007: 322). China is also given as the only country whose missiles target the US (Segal in Buzan and Foot 2005) and its more recent move toward military development is somewhat suspiciously observed by the US. Although, China is given as spending (US) $80 billion annually and, compared to the US amount of $400 billion per year, is not a significant threat to US security (Kurlantzick 2007). Theorists such as Buzan (2009) have indicated that there is a difficulty in distinguishing between offensive and defensive military strategies as the procurement of arms, for either purpose leads to a fear of attack and “...in the process of providing various forms of security, insecurities are also reproduced” (Dalby in Krause and Williams 1997: 13).

Hence, China can be seen as following all appropriate frameworks that favour regional stability, the promotion of public and cultural diplomacy and are also working hard to ensure that their rise is not perceived as a threat to the prevailing status quo. China’s continued economic growth and ability to align itself with developed and developing countries alike sees that its utilisation of soft power has not only been deemed a success, but has led to a debate over ‘the Washington Consensus versus the Beijing Consensus’ (in Africa) in relation to the best economic model for development. However, China’s main criticism and subsequent limitation surrounds the inability of the CCP to loosen the grip of state control and, as Nye has suggested, China requires greater concentration on domestic freedoms in order to sustain and expand its global aims, which are inherently based (for now at least) on economic domination and increased global cooperation.

Sources:

·Anderson, H., ‘China is fuelling war in Darfur’, 13 July 2008, BBC News, available as of 9 April 2011 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7503428.stm

·‘Australia-China Council’, Australian Government: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, available as of 8 April 2011 at http://www.dfat.gov.au/acc/index.html

·‘Australia-China Free Trade Agreement Negotiations’, Australian Government: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, available as of 8 April 2011 at http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/acfta/

·Buzan, B. and Foot, R., Does China Matter? A Reassessment: Essays in memory of Gerald Segal, Routledge 2004, Oxon

·Buzan, B., People, States and Fear (2nd edition): an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era, ECPR Press 2009, Colchester

·Dalby, S., ‘From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies’ in Krause, K. and Williams, M., Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, UCL Press Ltd 1997, London

·‘Exchanges between China and Africa’, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of South Africa, available as of 10 April 2011 at http://www.chinese-embassy.org.za/eng/znjl/t177585.html

·Jentleson, W., American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century (3rd edition), Norton and Company. Inc. 2007, London

·Kurlantzick, J., Charm offensive: how China’s soft power is transforming the world’, Yale University 2007, New York

·Nye, J., ‘The Olympics and Chinese Soft Power’ 24 August 2008, The Huffington Post, available as of 4 April 2011 at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-nye/the-olympics-and-chinese_b_120909.html

·‘The rise of China: setting alarm bells ringing?’, Clingendael: Netherlands Institute for International Relations, The Newsletter, No. 53, Spring 2010, available as of 10 April 2011 at http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2010/20100301_ciep_review_bbuijs.pdf

A Critical Analysis Of The Duncan Hunter Defense Act

The Duncan Hunter National Defense ACT: A critical review

Tensa Rwegasira

The Duncan Hunter National Defence Act, Is from Biden (US Vice President) and Pelosi (Speaker) to Obama (USA President). In it they discuss the best means of improving America’s public and cultural diplomacy.

The Duncan Hunter National Defence Act is a report on a comprehensive interagency strategy for public diplomacy and strategic communication. This is done by two means, synchronization and deliberate communication and engagement.

Synchronization

Synchronization here means coordinating words and deeds including the active consideration of how American actions and policies will be interpreted by public audiences as an organic part of decision making which is seen as important task. America’s notion is that what we do is more important than what we say because actions have communicative value and send messages. How this will be obtained? By means of fostering a culture of communication that values this type of synchronization and encourages decision – makers to take the communicative value of actions into account during their decision making.

Deliberate Communication and Engagement

America has put up programmes focused on understanding, engaging, informing, influencing, and communicating with people through public affairs, public diplomacy, information operations and other efforts. This will improve America’s government’s ability to deliberately communicate and engage with intended audiences.

This is intended to bolster communication, data collection and help with security threats and strategic planning. It is also to avoid the past incidents during the cold war, where congress fought with developmental agencies for example USAID. Also to improve the notion of the American foreign policy neo – conservative paradigm in which America tends to focus on the elites rather than the people being ruled by the elites. The need for legitimacy is key for American foreign policy because you can only flex your muscle power so much. With legitimacy comes international support and assistance. The revival of soft power and cultural diplomacy is seen as important for American foreign policy.

This report has some strength; but it also has some weaknesses. First the strengths.
 The major positive aspect of this report is the focus on interagency coordination and collaboration, which are seen as key to American foreign policy. This is intended not only to foster interagency collaboration but also to minimize interagency friction and wasteful rivalry. Emphasis has also been put on communication and engagement to avoid explicit propaganda and one way communication. This was a lesson learned during the cold war era of public and cultural diplomacy. 

However the same report has some weak aspects. It is silent about the vision, which is supposed to give overall guidance to the strategy formulation. What type of public and cultural diplomacy is envisioned by the USA in this post-cold war era? This should have been given first. The lack of a shared vision can undermine the effectiveness of the public and cultural diplomacy programs to be undertaken in the future. A common vision would also be a coordinative mechanism not only among different programs but also among various governments departments and agencies. This is one lesson, which should have been learnt from the cold war era public and cultural diplomacy. Vision in terms of guiding the strategy is not clarified well. Also goals and objectives are not categorically outlined. On top of that, strategy success indicators are not discussed.

The outcome is that, with the goals and objectives not thoroughly discussed, the suggested measures of performance and measures of effectiveness as milestones of performance in the implementation of the suggested strategy may not be well designed or talked about.

Cold War Exchange Diplomacy: still going strong?

Nicholas Cull discusses the idea of exchange diplomacy in his 2008 book ‘The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy’ where he also outlines four other Cold War areas of focus for the government funded United States Information Agency (USIA) as listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy and international broadcasting. The aim of this blog is to outline the impact of the Cold War exchange diplomacy strategy and how it has impacted contemporary public and cultural diplomacy efforts. While the Cold War saw state-led efforts of American exhibitions that demonstrated the affluent lifestyle of the US and the subsequent benefits of democratic life, the more integrated people-to-people aspects as illustrated by the Fulbright Program with a core theme of “peace and cultural understanding through educational exchange” (www.fulbright.co.uk 2011), have been seen to gain greater recognition from a wider audience. Fulbright covers a range of exchange programs from students, teachers, professionals and artists and operates in over 155 countries (www.exchanges.state.gov 2011) and has been deemed a successful method of exchange diplomacy. Such practices continue today outside of state-led efforts, as illustrated by Next Education Group and their recent request for host families in the US (www.timesherald.com 2011).

A recent development in exchange diplomacy is indicated by the introduction of a journalist exchange program between the US and Russia. Following meetings of 2-4 March 2011 in Boston, media leaders are launching the program to “confront stereotypes and increase mutual understanding” between the two countries (www.scoop.co.nz 2011). The program will focus on a variety of aspects including journalism ethics, young journalist exchanges and also introduce a collaborative platform called ARENA whereby all involved groups can contribute, share information and exchange ideas. The program will include traditional media organisations as well as more modern and non-governmental strands and is given as an outcome of the Mass Media meeting, a subgroup of the US-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission of 2009 (ibid). Three participating Russian delegates, themselves leaders of media outlets, all participated in exchange programs to the US previously and indicate this as a productive method of breaking down cultural barriers. The program, due to commence in 2012, will promote schemes such as pairing-up journalists from each country to report on a global issue, as well as news from each country being written by the guest journalist (ibid). The program plans to share business practices, see enhanced people-to-people interaction, encourage bilateral relations between the US and Russia and also to improve cultural cooperation via the realisation of shared interests.

In this manner, the Cold War hostilities between the US and Russia are placed aside and, although this particular method has strong governmental links, it also demonstrates the evolution of exchange diplomacy into the 21st Century whereby both countries are “dedicated to identifying areas of cooperation and joint projects that strengthen strategic stability, international security and the development of ties between the Russian and American people” (www.state.gov 2011). So to clarity if what Cull (2008) terms USIA exchange diplomacy is still going strong is to recognise the investment of the US and Russia into programs such as the journalism exchange as illustrated above. Hence, not only is it going strong but it has been globally implemented with increased levels of success.

Sources:

·Cull, N. J., The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989, Cambridge University Press 2008, New York

·Scoop World Independent News, Journalist Exchanges Promised from U.S.-Russia Conference, 23 March 2011 available at http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO1103/S00809/journalist-exchanges-promised-from-us-russia-conference.htm

·Times Herald, Student exchange program is looking for host families, available as of 10 April 2011 at http://timesherald.com/articles/2011/04/10/news/doc4da22f75d8b79004314194.txt

·U.S. Department of State, Fulbright Program, available as of 7 April 2011 at http://exchanges.state.gov/academicexchanges/index/fulbright-program.html

·U.S. Department of State, U.S. Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission Working Groups to Meet in Moscow to Support Cooperation in Education, Science, and Innovation February 28 – March 5, 25 February 2011, available as of 8 April 2011 at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/02/157131.htm

CELEBRITY DIPLOMACY

It is only in the last few years, that something which Professor Andrew F. Cooper calls ‘celebrity diplomacy’, has truly come under the magnifying glass. He asserts that even this notion of ‘celebrity diplomacy’ has over time evolved, and distinguishes between the old type of ‘celebrity diplomacy’ where celebrities are ‘entrapped’ to only working for a certain institution or charity and promoting only that cause, and have rarely made it on their own outside the boundaries of that institution or charity. (Vallely, P. 2009) The new ‘celebrity diplomacy’, even though the old one is still very much alive, is the emergence of those celebrities that are completely independent in their diplomacy actions, and that this is a ‘new phenomenon’. These celebrities, and Andrew Cooper especially mentions Bob Geldof and Bono, with their massive fame who are able to get more face-to-face time with national leaders than traditional diplomats are. (Ibid.) Therefore, have celebrities become the diplomats of the modern age? What is the criticism towards celebrity diplomacy compared to traditional diplomacy? Are there limits to celebrity diplomacy?

Legitimacy is one big criticism that usually comes up when looking at ‘celebrity diplomacy’. As Andrew Cooper and many others who are looking at celebrity diplomacy, Bob Geldof and Bono are usually the names that pop up most often. Where does the legitimacy for these two celebrities come from, that they are able to successfully push their own views out, even though they are not diplomats, and the fact that they can actually influence national leaders to do what they want to get done. (Vallely, P. 2009) Jack Spence, a professor at King’s College, merely calls Bono and Bob Geldof ‘lobbyists’ and not diplomats. ‘Lobbying’, according to Jack Spence, is what Bono has done especially when it comes to raising awareness about issues such as aid and debt, and fears that even though raising awareness is good, when it comes to other more complex and important issues, there is a fear that people would be more easily intrigued and swept away by what these celebrities say, which is not necessarily a good thing. (Ibid.) Heribert Dieter of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs highlights the issues relating to raising awareness of debt and aid and the need to raise money that Bono does, is the fact that it ‘gives people the false impression that aid is the solution to everything’. (Ibid.) Others believe though that celebrities have extreme legitimacy that derives from the idea that ‘they speak for the common man’, explains Professor Raymond Cohen from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This idea derives from the fact that celebrities, unlike other diplomats and politicians, are not attached to interests of one’s state, they have no national interests at heart and do not represent just those interests, but rather seen as advocates of universal interests. (Ibid.) Celebrities are also more often than others very willing to talk about their causes and concerns in interviews and on television, which gives a sense of transparency to what they are doing and people are easily more attracted to that, and that there is always a kind of reservation of people to anything that politicians say, but not necessarily towards celebrities. (Ibid.) Celebrities though, most often, seem to have their own kind of ‘niche’ in their diplomacy efforts, and that is raising money and raising awareness of issues. Celebrities are rarely able to influence bigger more complex issues like trade matters, which are securely in the domain of states and because these issues are more complex, they are less able to be influenced, which highlights the limits of celebrity diplomacy and exactly how far it can go. (Ibid.)

Still, celebrity diplomacy is something worth looking at. Even though it is less or more successful depending on the area of diplomacy efforts, it is a worthy source to use for addressing global problems. It is not the only source though, and not too much emphasis should be put on the absolute importance of celebrity diplomacy, but as an alternative and additional channel very useful. Public Diplomacy in the 21^st century is different, and celebrity diplomacy reflects this new era of the importance of ‘networking’ by all necessary actors, not just states. (Bentley, M. & Cussen, S. 2007)

References:

- Bentley, Melissa & Cussen, Sarah (2007) Celebrity Diplomacy: Challenges and Opportunities. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Canada Institute. September 25. From: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1420&fuseaction=topics.event_summary&event_id=274217 Accessed: 2.4.2011

- Vallely, Paul (2009) From A-lister to Aid Worker: Does Celebrity Diplomacy Really Work? The Independent, January 17. From: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/from-alister-to-aid-worker-does-celebrity-diplomacy-really-work-1365946.html Accessed: 2.4.2011