Non State Actors & Public & Cultural Diplomacy

It has been mentioned that public has traditionally been viewed as being used by nation states rater than non - state actors. Public diplomacy techniques and strategies by different political actors, ad increasing efforts by those actors to use public diplomacy to appeal to diverse audiences.

There is not much emphasis being put on the use of public diplomacy by local and regional actors in the region. Those political organizations use public and cultural diplomacy cultivate legitimacy, reach out to new allies, and win hearts and minds.

Knowing how non - state actors operate with public diplomacy can help better our understanding of public and cultural diplomatic strategies whether it be in the Arab world or elsewhere. This can be done particularly through analyzing the links between policy and public diplomacy on one side and how those between words and actions on the other side.

Issues stemming from the post 9/11 are important to us and how the west is perceived. Changes happening in the Arab world in terms of CHANGE from authoritarian to a transitional change to more "democratic" system have called for reform and how public and cultural diplomacy should be handled.

Ever since the post 9/11 America for example and it's controversial occupation of Iraq continued alienating governments and individuals by means of hard power rather than soft power during the post 9/11 have been recalled to re asses its approach towards the Arab world.

Diplomatic, think - tank and media have been debating over what changes in foreign policies and in communication strategies might improve America's and west reputation abroad (Zatepilina, Pg. 157.

The role of non - state actors like nonprofit, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) in particularly to America is seen as very important. NGOs have been, implicitly or explicitly, engaged in public diplomacy for some time. In other words the role and relationship with foreign publics and to manage organisational reputation overseas is crucial. To point out that, if NGOs are backed by a formally recognised framework integrating state and non state public diplomacy, non-state actors feel that they conceivably could do much more to advance America's and the wests position worldwide (Zatepilin, Pg. 158-159). NGOs are gaining power in world affairs at the same time NGOs according to Atack (1999) describes developmental NGOs as actively attempting to influence governments' and multilateral institutions' development policies (Zatepilina, Pg. 159).

Edwards characterized the global engagement of development NGOs as "cost - effective" public relatons for both nation-states and international organisations (Zatepilina, Pg. 158).

Do NGOs have their own agenda? Referring to NGOs' political interests and agendas, however Simmons (1998) argued that "They have the potential to do as much harm as good" (Zatepilina, Pg. 158). For example development NGOs are more likely than any other types of NGOs to be scrutinised for their dependence on government funds(Zatepilina, Pg. 158).

So far we have gathered that:

(1) Non - state actors' involvement is essential for public diplomacy.
(2) Non - state actors' experiences in building institutional relationships and managing organisational reputations overseas add value to the reputation of their country of origin (Zatepilina, Pg. 159).

Both international development and media backgrounds emphasised the importance of co - operation, trust, and empowerment. Successful development NGOs as recognised by both their donors and recipients. This also involves their foreign counterparts in the design, implementation and evaluation of their programmes.

In regards to implementation some of the best broadcasts - as supported by audience research overseas, are those produced in conjunction with NGOs' foreign media partners. There is much emphasis needed to be stressed in regards to relationship building. This entails the relationships between NGOs and foreign publics whether they may be formal, informal or friendship (Zatepilina 161). The relationships whom they may affect is seen as important. Whether it may be local staff, local partner organisations and foreign elites (Zatepilina, Pg. 161).

NGOs enjoy mre credibility among foreign publics, most audiences overseas are suspicious of governments (Zatepilina 162). International development NGOs in the other hand are often perceived as more credible because they work directly with the people.

Lastly NGOs latitude of movement and freedom of speech within host countries were mentioned by many as prerequisites to being seen as truth worthy by local publics (Zatepilina, Pg. 162 - 163).

To conclude on non - state actors and how non state actors contribute in public and cultural diplomacy is the notion that NGOs realize that "their success or failure overseas depends on their institutional reputation, which in turn is determined by their relationships with foreign publics" (Zatepilina, Pg. 166). Respect and trust for local staff and local counterparts are imperative for maintaining rapport beneficial institutional relationships in host countries (Zatepilina, Pg. 166 - 167). Sharing processes, not outcomes, makes foreign publics trust NGOs and respect their country of origin (Zatepilina, Pg. 166).

NGOs enjoy the latitude in host contries and the credibility among foreign publics that some goverments officials may lack (Zatepilina, Pg. 166). NGOs understand that they represent their nation state no matter whether they get governmental aide or do not.

It is important to both understand the position of NGOs and the political actors and institutes of the government's. The government "works on policies that will have a long - term outcome but do not always affect foreign publics directly, NGOs provide tangible assistance that makes the most difference immediately" (Zatepilina, Pg. 166).

Reputation is important aspect not to be overlooked, reputation in world politics matters as much as it does in the corporate world (Zatepilina, Pg. 157 - 158). That being said governments and politicians' credibility is a power resource that nation states rely upon in their relations with other nation states.

When it comes to public and cultural diplomacy a nation state reputation is determined by three key points:

(1) It's relationship with foreign publics
(2) Foreign publics direct experiences with the country
(3) The communications and symbols comparing its actions to those of other countries (Zatepilina, Pg.158).

This is what a NGO does, making NGOs or non - state actors role important in Public and cultural diplomacy.


Sources

Zatepilina, Olga. "Non-state ambassadors: NGOs' contribution to America's public diplomacy." Palgrave Macmillan (2008): 158. Web. 20 Mar 2011. .

Where does the diaspora fit in with Public Diplomacy?

Within the field of international politics, Public Diplomacy (taken here to include cultural diplomacy) has become an indispensable tool of statecraft. Public Diplomacy can and often is expressed in a wide variety of ways, some of which include international exchanges, overseas broadcasting and language institutes. Nevertheless, the power of the diaspora as an element of public diplomacy is far too often overlooked in academia and remains unrecognized by the public at large.

The diaspora can be used both as a tool and a target by their native government. In addition, the diaspora is a power in its own right by holding the ability to exert pressure over its native government. In targeting their diaspora, the native government strives to ensure that close links with the homeland are maintained and that the views towards the homeland remain favourable. Further to this, investments in the homeland are strongly encouraged. With that said, this post will focus on the function of the diaspora as a public diplomacy tool. Thus the homeland makes use of its diaspora to promote a positive image of the country as well as its culture in the host state. In addition, the diaspora become potential lobbyists in pursuing the interests of the homeland. (d’Hooghe, 2007 and van Ham, 2007, p.116-128)

When thinking of an active overseas community, the Jewish diaspora springs to mind. Israel has successfully cultivated its ties with its diaspora worldwide and frequently employs it as a tool in pursuing its national interests. In fact, Israel has a Ministry for Public and Diaspora affairs. However, instead of focusing on the Jewish diaspora which has already received relative much attention (see the Israel Lobby book), this post will highlight the Chinese overseas community. With over 40 million people outside China, its diaspora is the world’s largest. That, and the fact that the Chinese are present in over 130 countries make its diaspora a very interesting example. Attention should also be given to China’s active engagement in public diplomacy, sometimes lingering on the verge of hyperactivity. (d’Hooghe, 2007)

In China, the Chinese communities abroad were traditionally viewed in an unfavourable light. This stigma came under challenge by the Chinese Reforms (“Socialism with Chinese characteristics”) and gradually withered away. Instead, having recognized the value of its diaspora, China began to capitalize on it (Xinhua News Agency, 2004). Although Chinese overseas communities are diverse both in terms of origin and length (some dating back beyond the 19^th century and others recent), they do possess a strong shared identity and remain closely attached to their homeland. As such, the diaspora forms an active part of the national effort in achieving public diplomacy goals. In fact, China regularly makes use of its diaspora on specific issues. For example, when large pro-Tibetan demonstrations calling for a boycott of the 2008 Olympic Games in China were held in many Western cities, even larger demonstrations were held in support of the Olympic Games in Australia, Japan, Malaysia and Thailand where the majority participants were part of the Chinese community. Another example is how the diaspora has been charged with the task to lobby and promote a peaceful reunification with Taiwan. (van Ham, 2007, p.114-134 and Xinhua News Agency, 2005)

So where does the diaspora fit in with public diplomacy? It is clear that there is a role for the diaspora in public diplomacy, and that this is increasingly recognized by governments worldwide. With that said, the extent to which diaspora diplomacy impacts vary and must be properly analysed before any authoritative conclusions can be drawn.

Sources:

d'Hooghe, Ingrid (2007), "The Rise of China's Public Diplomacy", Clingendael Diplomatic Papers, no.12, July

van Ham, Peter(2007), "Power, Public Diplomacy and the Pax Americana", in, Melissen, Jan(ed), The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, Palgrave Macmillian

Xinhua News Agency(2004), "Overseas Chinese Key Force in Nation's Revival", July 21, http://www.china.org.cn/english/2004/july/101732.htm

Xinhua News Agency(2005), "Premier Wen Calls for Overseas Chinese to promote China's peaceful reunification", May 21, http://www.china.org.cn/english/China/129487.htm

‘WINDOWS TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD’

‘Science and technology have acted powerfully as moderating influences, as forces pulling Russia towards the West, as factors reducing the differences between Russia and the West’

Loren R.Graham, What have we learned about Science and Technology from the Russian experience? (Richmond, 2003, p.65)

Yale Richmond in his book ‘Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Rising the Iron Curtain’ gives a record of various cultural exchanges which took place between USSR and the US during the Cold War. This book is an interesting addition to the scope of theories and speculations about the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War. Namely, while many scholars argue that events of 1989 were a result of Soviet domestic polices or other ill-thought out external policies, Richmond argues that the Cold War ended because of the US-USSR cultural exchanges.

In one of the chapters devoted to the science and technology, he explains the difficult situation of the Soviet scientists who struggled with the control and other limitation imposed by the Soviet system on their research capabilities. In this time, not many of them were allowed to travel abroad to exchange their observations or to discuss technological innovations. Nevertheless, joined efforts of the Soviet and US scientists helped to change things for better and thanks to their initiatives many cultural agreements were signed between those two countries. (Richmond, 2003) However, it was only after 1972 when the exchange ‘boom’ took place. From that time, the Soviet scientist could more often travel abroad, American scientist could spend more time in the Soviet laboratories and even common projects were developed. The American government supported the scientific exchanges as it secretly hoped that they not only could help to solve problems in the filed of science but, also, could help to solve those which existed in politics. (Richmond, 2003) On the contrary, the Soviet authority mainly enjoyed the scientific exchanges because it helped the USSR to keep a track of American innovations. (Richmond, 2003) The Cold War was a battle of two clashing ideologies and it wasn’t easy for scientists to operate in such a difficult environment. On a number of occasions their relations were disturbed by the political downturns. Nevertheless, the US and Soviet scientist managed to maintain their relations in tact despite political tensions between their governments. Richmond believes that slowly but, surely, they also influenced the policies of their countries while keeping the scientific contacts alive. It is also claimed that Gorbachev was under strong influence of the international community of scientists what should not be underestimated when analyzing factors which interplayed in the run-up to the end of the Cold War. (Richmond, 2003)

This and other interesting examples can be found in this book. I would like to recommend it to everyone who is interested in the Cold War period and who would like to explore other views on how the war ended.

Sources:

Richmond Y., Cultural Exchange & The Cold War: Raising The Iron Curtain, 2003, the Pennsylvania State University

Is it a plane, is it a bird? No it's Obama!?!?!

The 9/11, doubtlessly, had a great impact on the US public diplomacy. It was the time when American officials realized that the USA had a serious image problem in regard to the Arab and Islamic world. Consequently, as soon as the war on terror was launched, the public diplomacy, next to the military forces, became the second most important ‘weapon’ in the battle with extremism. (Zaharna, 2009)

In the aftermath of 9/11, the Bush administration recruited a number of people who, using the most advanced technological innovations begun to ‘sell America to the Arab and Islamic world’. (Zaharna, 2009, p.2) The post 9/11 public diplomacy ‘solders’ such as Charlotte Beers, Karen Hughes and then James Glassman tried hard, but, as we all know, not hard enough to effectively promote the USA’s culture and values in, presumably, Americans’ bloodshed thirsty countries.

Nowadays, barely anyone argues that the US post 9/11 public diplomacy initiatives did not have any downsides. Here, one of Nicholas Cull’s lessons on the future of public diplomacy should be put forward. Namely, that ‘public diplomacy begins with listening’. (Cull, 2009) Yes, America did not want to listen as it was far too important to the officials to ‘get the US message out’ rather then to actively engage with the foreign audience. (Zaharna, 2009, p.3) The two-way communication could not take place because the US officials, simply, neither ‘remembered’ nor ‘cared’ about including a dialogue with the Arab and Muslim audience into their agenda. It should not be a surprise that the US efforts in ‘explaining America’ ended with a fiasco and resulted in an intensification of anti-American attitudes. It’s a shame that Nick Cull was unable to give some lessons to American public diplomacy architects at that time. He, definitely, also would remind the US officials about keeping the public diplomacy in tact with the foreign policy objectives as, according to Cull, ‘the golden rule of public diplomacy is that what counts is not what you say but what you do’. (Cull, 2009)

As soon as Bush administration ended and Obama stepped in, it has been instantly noted that the lesson on public diplomacy has been learned. The offensive character of the US public diplomacy has been replaced with gentle messages proclaiming understanding, respect and dialogue. (Zaharna, 2009) Now, listening, was the world repeatedly used by Obama in speeches and interviews dedicated to Arabic and Muslim audiences. The Obama speech in Cairo and the New Year message to Iranian citizens signify radical change in style from the Bush administration.

Obama speech to Iranian citizens:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HY_utC-hrjI

Clearly, President Barack Obama tries to reach ‘hears and minds’ of Arab and Islamic audiences. Nevertheless, there is still much skepticism regarding Obama’s approach to public diplomacy. The main concern is the chronic disconnection of American public diplomacy from the US foreign policy. Zaharna argues that ‘Obama does appear to have the intention of changing U.S. policies. Until that policy threshold is reached, however, U.S. public diplomacy will remain a precarious balancing act between holding out the promise of change and making that change happen’ (Zaharna, 2009, p. 9) Hopefully, the US President will be successful in improving relations with the Islamic world. However, for now, this still is a pure wish rather then reality.

Sources:

Cull N., Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the past

http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/publications/perspectives/CPDPerspectivesLessons.pdf

Zaharna R.S., Obama, U.S. Public Diplomacy and the Islamic World, World Politics Review, 16 March 2009, available at:

http://www.american.edu/soc/faculty/upload/Zaharna-public-diplomacy-islamic-world.pdf

The Role of Non-State Actors in Public Diplomacy: appearances can be deceptive

By J Thompson

John Brown, former Senior Foreign Service worker, comments on his blog (http://www.publicdiplomacypressandblogreview.blogspot.com/ 2011) in light of the 50th anniversary celebrations of the Peace Corps Association about the success and external perception of such a group. Brown outlines US state support for the public diplomacy efforts of Peace Corp volunteers worldwide and the desire of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Judith McHale, for a continued emphasis of the important role such non-state representatives have in relation to US diplomacy. McHale is quoted as highlighting the grass-roots approach of such ‘citizen diplomats’ and how such direct person-to-person contact can have a resounding positive impact on global perceptions of the US. The blog also offers a link, however, to an article composed by Brown in the Huffington Post which illustrates the detrimental effect that Peace Corp members may also have (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 2011). In this context Brown indicates that a lack of education and understanding of contemporary issues affecting the host country may present an impression of an individual who has little or no concern for issues outside of the US, subsequently portraying a negative image and damaging public diplomacy efforts.

Brown also criticises roles undertaken by Peace Corp volunteers such as teaching english whereby the literacy levels of many American’s can be seen as questionable when compared with global standards, offering post-modern language derived from social networking sites and the like as contributing factors for the decline in US literary ability. Brown’s remarks in the Huffington Post illustrate that methods undertaken by the Peace Corps can be seen as non-bilateral and based upon a US driven monologue, likening such methods to the 20th century one-way propaganda strategies of the Cold War. Brown summarises by indicating that the US could utilise such dogmatic public diplomacy methods but in the reverse context whereby host countries may, for example, send highly achieving academic representatives to teach poorly performing US children basic math and english (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 2011.

Other examples of public diplomacy are undertaken in less structured settings, an example of which can be given by a North Korean and Israeli friendship group that formed last year. While the Israeli branch is relatively new, the Korean Friendship Association (KFA), a North-Korean government affiliated organisation, has been in operation for some time and has groups all over the globe including South America, Europe and Asia (http://www.jpost.com/ 2011). While not supporting North Korea’s regime, the Israeli group affiliates express solidarity with the country due to attacks from ‘imperialist’ outsiders (ibid). Yerushalmi, the Israeli branch administrator, urges for a Palestinian Socialist territory and sees the friendship group as a means to overcome not only imperialist forces, but also the Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite this political undertone, the Korean and Israeli links formed, as with all other global KFA affiliates, have the primary objective of friendship and cultural exchange. The Jerusalem Post article indicates that while Yerushalmi’s views regarding the Israeli-Palestine situation may be somewhat extreme, they are by no means illegal and that the KFA have no governmental influence in either country.

While the KFA may initially appear misplaced within Israel due to contradictory governmental policies on both sides, at its most simplistic form, the friendship group appears to have global recognition and a level of success regarding the objective of cultural exchange. In this manner, although the North Korean government is affiliated, the KFA have apparent autonomy from the state and operate as a successful representation of public diplomacy at the non-state actor level. Such informal and unstructured relations, when compared to the Peace Corps examples of ‘one-way’ Cold War methods, can perhaps be deemed more appropriate in today’s globalised world and offer room for improvement in relation to US public diplomacy efforts. However, if nothing else, the Peace Corps and KFA indicate that there is a growing and continual link between the role and significance of non-state actors and the positive public diplomacy that such groups may have upon the global community.


Sources:

Brown, J., ‘Remarks at the Reception Marking of the 50th Anniversary of the Peace Corps’, John Brown’s Public Diplomacy Blog and Press Review available as of 15 March 2011 at http://publicdiplomacypressandblogreview.blogspot.com/

Brown, J. (11 March 2011), ‘Public Diplomacy: The World Should Be Teaching Us, Mr. Kristof’, The Huffington Post, available as of 15 March 2011 at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-brown/public-diplomacy-the-worl_b_495224.html

Hamerman, J. (11 March 2011), ‘Israelis form North Korea friendship group’, The Jerusalem Post, available as of 15 March 2011 at http://www.jpost.com/International/Article.aspx?id=211694

US Department of State: Diplomacy in Action (March 2011), ‘Remarks at the Reception Marking of the 50th Anniversary of the Peace Corps’, available as of 15 March 2011 at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/03/158405.htm

FIJI: THE IMPACT OF ‘RENT-A-SOLDIER’ NATION BRANDING

By J Thompson

(http://www.coupfourandahalf.com/ 2011)

Coaffee and van Ham’s 2008 article ‘Security Branding’: The role of security in marketing the city, region or state regarding security branding outlines how externally perceived ‘insecurity’ causes significant risk to the status of a country which can take a considerable amount of time and effort to rectify. The opposing view to this is the perception of a country as being ‘secure’ in terms of political and economic stability, in addition to domestic support for the governmental structure, with the impact of such as representing a positive and secure global image (Coaffee and van Ham 2008). The article goes on to outline that a ‘corporate and political’ agenda is, or should be, a priority within the policy framework of a state and again links the political and economic strength and stability as portraying an image of state security. Coaffee and van Ham do, however, outline that security in the contemporary context can be seen in include a variety of health concerns/pandemics and natural disasters and that careful handling of such issues, as well as military strategies, is seen as vital to the success of a nation’s ‘branding’.

Since the post-colonial era Fiji can be seen to have adopted an image that highlighted its strong and dependable military force, one that was utilised by the British during the colonial period in global settings and promoted, somewhat inadvertently, as a ‘rent-a-soldier’ following this time. Fiji was quick to align itself with peacekeeping missions carried out by the UN and, as such, successfully branded itself as a ‘peace-keeping’ security force and gained global recognition for such efforts. The Fijian Embassy in Washington DC held a Pacific cultural event held with over 800 public and private sector guests present whereby traditional food, dance and singing were shared as an example of public and cultural diplomacy to improve relations. The event was also host to marketing campaigns and nation branding exercises that saw business discussions taking place whereby Fiji promoted the services of security personnel.

“With the existential Soviet threat now long gone, security has turned from ultimate survival tools to a luxury item, which is branded at a high premium. For example, like other elite brands, the EU and NATO wear their logos like Armani and Chanel labels, telling their clientele that buying their ‘product’ (i.e. security) implies that they are sophisticated and safe.” (Coaffee and van Ham 2008)

Directors from RONCO Consulting Corporation outlined that while there were no contracts at present they would be keen to include Fijian security personnel on their data base for future ‘global deployment’, illustrating the positive image promoted by previous personnel in Iraq (http://www.fijiembassydc.com/). RONCO have a wide range of clients including the US (private and public sector groups) the World Bank, several Western European governments, NATO and various other commercial firms (ibid). The Fijian Embassy event, when placed in the context of Coaffee and van Ham’s article, highlights the relevance of domestic and international acceptance of nation branding based upon a wider image of security as set by globally legitimate ‘peacekeeping’ forces or institutional bodies as demonstrated by NATO or the EU. However, it should be noted that the Fijian Embassy website did not supply any dates regarding the Pacific cultural event but it seems likely that this took place several years before the military coup in 2006.

The 2009 article Exporting Fijian Forces (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/) outlines that the Fijian security services have been utilised for many years to serve as a ‘discount’ military force and that the local economy is dependent upon such income. The military coup in 2006 is said to suppress democracy and the freedom of Fijians, as well as revenue obtained from the use of its military force given as ‘propping-up’ the regime (ibid). Since the coup, Australia and New Zealand have increasingly called for the UN to ban the use of Fijian soldiers and military personnel from peacekeeping missions, as undertaken in Iraq for example. Such a ban was implemented in 2009, although it is noted that existing Fijian military personnel will continue their UN positions but that no further procurement will take place (ibid). The Fijian economy has traditionally relied upon sugar and textile production but has, in recent years, become increasingly drawn toward the use of its citizens as global military or security personnel. As a result of the 2009 ban of Fijian military personnel in UN peacekeeping missions, such personnel are increasingly seeking employment within private security firms so as to continue to utilise the skills which the nation has historically branded itself with and, until recently, were globally recognised and deemed legitimate.

Amnesty International has sought to raise awareness of existing and continual human rights violations from the military regime, reporting the suppression of democratic freedoms and the arbitrary arrest of any citizens seen to oppose the regime (http://www.amnesty.org.nz/ 2011). The recent popular uprisings in the Middle East saw Fijian people organising a peaceful protest against the regime on 4th March 2011 and while local media is given as widely suppressed the Australian media have made efforts to keep the world informed. Radio Australia (http://www.radioaustralia.au.net/) reported that the 4th March 2011 demonstration were subsequently cancelled due to a heavy military presence in the designated protest area, as well as the detention of activists and political opposition leaders. In this manner, the nation branding efforts of Fiji have been diminished by the current regime and a sense of domestic insecurity now dominates the global perception of Fiji.

Hence, using the ideas noted within Coaffee and van Ham’s ‘Security Branding’ article, it can be argued that while Fiji were seen as domestically secure, they were able to offer the governments and private security contractors a valuable service which allowed Fijian military personnel positions within the UN peacekeeping missions in locations such as Sudan, Liberia, Darfur and Iraq (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/ 2009). However, since the military coup in 2006 which saw a dramatic reduction in the democratic freedom of the Fijian citizens and the implementation of a Public Emergency Regulation which further restricts ‘freedom of expression and peaceful assembly’ (http://www.amnesty.org.nz/ 2011), there has been an international outcry for the prevention of Fijian military personnel for UN peacekeeping operations. Due to Australian and New Zealand groups lobbying, the UN have since banned the use of Fijian military personnel in such missions. The impact of this has led to a transition of such personnel from the public to private sector security. In this manner it can be argued that while the legitimate utilisation of Fijians as peacekeeping personnel has declined following the regime change in 2006, the success of its ‘rent-a-soldier’ branding can be seen as unwavering, with the ultimate price being that of the decline of the democratic process and human rights of its citizens.

Sources:

·Amnesty International (March 2011), Fiji: Fears for activists as military clamps down on peaceful protest plans, http://www.amnesty.org.nz/news/fiji-fears-activists-military-clamps-down-peaceful-protest-plans

·Coaffee, J. and van Ham. P., ‘‘Security Branding’: The role of security in marketing the city, region or state’, Place branding and public diplomacy (2008) Vol. 4:3

·Coup Four and a Half Blog (2011), http://www.coupfourandahalf.com/

·Fiji Embassy Washington DC, http://www.fijiembassydc.com/default.asp?contentID=810

·International Relations and Security Network (ISN), Bennett, J., R., (2009), Exporting Fijian Forces, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?lng=en&id=101406

·Radio Australia (4 March 2011), Anti-government march in Fiji is called off, http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/pacbeat/stories/201103/s3155654.htm

BRAND FINLAND

Finland is a country that many people have heard of, but yet know nothing about. Even with Nokia, Finland’s pride and joy, Nokia has never sought to advertise its Finnish roots because it has not been seen as advantageous for them and many people associate Nokia more with Japan, rather than Finland. (Rantanen, E. 2008) Finland today therefore, is in a great position to brand itself and promote its distinctive identity, not only by promoting Nokia as Finnish, but because research conducted by Teemu Moilanen and Seppo Rainisto in their book Building Finland’s Country Brand (2008) shows that even though Finland is not very well known in the world, people’s opinions about it are still hugely positive. That is why Finland needs a consistent and coherent image, which it can project abroad. (Current State of Finland’s Brand, 2010) In 2008, Finland started its own Brand Committee to figure out the Finnish ‘brand’, and they were instructed by ‘Competitive Identity’ master Simon Anholt. (Finnish Nation Branding Workgroup unveils Brand Finland Strategy, 2010) So what exactly did they come up with for Brand Finland?

Simon Anholt instructed the Finnish Brand Committee to think about the question of ‘What can we do, in order for other countries to need us?’ (Ängeslevä, P. 2010) The Report of the Finnish Brand Committee was published in 2010 starting with the words ‘Finland is already the best country in the world’. (Ibid.) The report highlights Finland’s strengths that it should use, mainly its ‘Functionality: Finland Works, Water: Drink Finland and Education: Finland gives you a lesson’ but summarizes together the main goal, which is to make Finland the ‘global problem-solver’. (Finnish Nation Branding Workgroup unveils Brand Finland Strategy, 2010) To be able to achieve this, the Finnish brand relies heavily on the character of Finnish people, the shyness and quietness, but extremely hardworking and driven to achieve results. (Current State of Finland’s Brand, 2010) Simon Anholt even summarized it in two slogans, ‘If you want results, get a Finn’ and ‘No talking, but action’. (Ängeslevä, P. 2010)

In 2010, the Country Brand Index showed that Finland was moving up on the list, now being in the 16^th position from previously holding the 28^th position, which was obviously good news for everyone working on Brand Finland. (New Insights on Finland’s Country Branding Program, 2010) Finland’s country branding initiative therefore seems to have been successful, especially when looking at the Country Brand Index. As far as success in being the ‘global problem-solver’, it remains to be seen. The Finnish ‘brand’ has definitely truly relied on the character of its people, and the image that is to be projected definitely ‘lies close to the country’s DNA’ and is surely something that all Finnish people can relate to. (Ibid.)

References:

- Current State of Finland’s Brand (2010) TehtavaSuomelle.fi, November, 25. Available from: http://www.tehtavasuomelle.fi/documents/TS_Current_State_of_Finlands_Brand_A4_EN.pdf Accessed: 8.3.2011

- Finnish Nation Branding Workgroup unveils Brand Finland Strategy (2010) NationBranding.info, November 27. Available from: http://nation.branding.info/2010/11/27/finland-nation-branding-strategy-unveiled/ Accessed: 24.2.2011

- Finnish-Dutch Trade Guild: New Insights on Finland’s Country Branding Program (2010) NationBranding.info, February, 10. Available from: http://nation-branding.info/2010/02/10/finland-country-branding-program/ Accessed: 8.3.2011

- Rantanen, Esko (2008) Suomi-brändi on ihan metsässä. Talouselämä, September 22. Available from: http://www.talouselama.fi/uutiset/article160899.ece Accessed: 24.2.2011

- Ängeslevä, Päivi (2010) Tässäkö Suomen brändi? Vertaa Työryhmän Tuloksia ja brändigurun näkemyksiä. Suomen Kuvalehti, November 25. Available from: http://suomenkuvalehti.fi/jutut/kotimaa/tassako-suomen-brandi-vertaa-tyoryhman-tuloksia-ja-brandigurun-nakemyksia Accessed: 8.3.2011