In the international diplomatic arena, the small state of Qatar has emerged as a shining star. As unpredictable as it seems, this Emirate is now a diplomatic actor to count on. How is this possible you may ask? How can such a small state have any leverage or hold any weight within the international community? What makes Qatar different from Bahrain or the United Arab Emirates? Let me take you on the journey of Qatari Diplomacy.
It is true that Qatar share many similarities with its immediate neighbours. Qatar hosts a significant number of guest workers in relation to its own small native population on a relatively small territory. In addition, it is an emirate and is rich in both oil and gas. However, unlike its neighbours on the initiative by Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani Qatar has pursued a very specific form of Public Diplomacy – namely Niche Diplomacy.
Niche Diplomacy can be defined as the concentration of “resources in specific areas best able to
generate returns worth having” (Ungerer, 2007, p.548). Put differently, by selectively focusing efforts in one area, often for the greater good of the international community, states gain influence in international relations that is disproportionate to their size and role in the wider international community. As such, it allows small states to overcome the difficulty of yielding influence. In the case of Qatar, niche diplomacy is employed for two reasons. First, it is a calculated effort to achieve more influence on an international scale by gaining international recognition. Second, it is a survival mechanism in an unstable region with two competing powers – Saudi Arabia and Iran. (Rockower,2008)
So what is Qatar’s niche diplomacy? Conflict mediation. Yes, Qatar has proven to be a skillful mediator. Its niche diplomacy success rests primarily on three elements. First, the Emir has placed Qatar in a unique position by cultivating close ties to many diverse states and actors, often at odds with one another. While hosting an American military base and maintaining a close friendship to the US, Qatar has intimate relations with Iran. Furthermore, despite being a key supporter of Hamas, Qatar has informal ties to Israel. Qatar convenes continuous meetings with Hamas officials within its territory while simultaneously pushing for the Middle East to develop economic ties with Israel. (Cooper and Momani 2010)
Second, Qatar is perceived as honest and independent, free from the dominance of major regional and global players. This in part due to its close ties to a wide variety of actors as well as its boldness to speak out. Qatar has opposed economic sanctions of Israel, but also chose to expel Israel’s trade commission in Doha after the bombardments of Lebanon in 2006. Furthermore, it is also attributed to Qatar’s mere size- by definition as a small state Qatar is not viewed as a potential threat to others. (Abraham,2008 and Rockower,2008)
Third, as a result of its oil and gas resources, Qatar has the ability to influence mediation efforts by the use of financial means. For example Qatar invites different parties to a conflict (including what it is seen as the rebel” side) to Doha for negotiations- all expenses paid by Qatar. Furthermore, Qatar also engages in humanitarian and reconstruction efforts where large donations are made. Such generosity endows Qatar with both access and credibility. Thus, this form of “checkbook diplomacy” is often employed to back up mediation efforts pursued by Qatar. (Reuters,2010 and Rockower,2008)
Having had a mediator role in many conflicts including Yemen, Darfur, Western Sahara and within the Palestinian factions, Qatar had its breakthrough with Lebanon in 2008. At the time Lebanon was on the brink of a civil war because of the inability of various factions to agree on the choice of President. After 18 months of political deadlock where the US, France, Saudi Arabia and the Arab League had all attempted to mediate the conflict it was Qatar that saved Lebanon from yet another devastating civil war. Since the other mediators had a perceived bias towards various factions they were unable to gain the trust of all. Only Qatar, with recognised links to all of the parties involved was able to bring the Lebanese factions together. (Cooper and Momani, 2010 and Janardhan,2010)
In conclusion, Qatar has succeeded in its role as a mediator because it is perceived as honest and trustworthy, it has strong ties to antithetical actors and is able to back up any mediation efforts with its checkbook diplomacy. As a result, Qatar has become much more than just another oil-rich emirate in the Arabian-peninsula. Qatar has gained influence in the realms of the international diplomatic scene- and rightly so.
SOURCES:
Abraham, George(2008), “Qatar is a diplomatic heavy-hitter”, Al Jazeera, July 1, http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2008/07/200872164735567644.html
Cooper, Andrew F and Momani, Bessma(2010), “Qatar and expanded contours of Small State Diplomacy”, February, http://www.arts.uwaterloo.ca/~bmomani/documents/ISA2010-Qatar.pdf
Janardhan, Dr N.(2010), “Niche diplomacy gets Qatar to its goal”, The Khaleej Times, December 30, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=/data/opinion/2010/December/opinion_December142.xml§ion=opinion
Reuters(2010), “Wealthy Qatar tries to build niche as conflict mediator”, al-Masrya al-Youm, June 4, http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/46676
Rockower,Paul(2008), “Qatar’s Public Diplomacy”, December 12
Ungerer,Carl(2007), “The ‘Middle Power’ Concept in Australian Foreign Policy”, The Journal of Politics and History, vol.53,nr.4,p.538-551
I found this to be really interesting and insightful as to Qatar's particular public diplomacy strategy. The notion of international recognition seems a continual theme in the diplomacy realms for both non-state actors as well as state representations. The niche form of diplomacy which has been illustrated in relation to Qatar with aspects of 'access' and 'credibility' seems both logical and successful and perhaps bigger states may look at Qatar's particular approach in order to improve their own public diplomacy efforts.
ReplyDeleteThere are, however, some domestic issues that arise within Qatar as indicated by several varying groups. Amnesty International has highlighted human rights violations where there are "allegations of torture or ill-treatment and adequate remedy of redress for victims" (www.amnestyusa.org). This article also outlines the oppression of women within the home whereby permission must be obtained from either a husband or senior male family member before a woman is permitted to travel, in addition to acts of domestic violence toward women not taken seriously by police.
Qatar was criticised by Human Rights Watch in 2001 in relation to the WTO meeting taking place there due to it not being a part of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (www.hrw.org). Qatar is also reported to have human rights violations toward migrant workers in the form of seizure of passports, poor working conditions and the delay or withholding of salaries. Human rights organisations reporting on such issues in Qatar highlight the lack of civil and political freedoms, the treatment of women and also the high levels of migrant worker in the country, raising concern of the treatment of migrant workers in light of the forthcoming 2022 World Cup (www.humanrights.ie). The website also has a link to a short film by Al Jazeera called 'Blood, Sweat and Tears' which aims to outline the plight of such migrant workers to Emirate countries, including Qatar: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hMxbpsw_UTE
In this manner, while Qatar has been hailed as a credible global diplomatic agent, it may wish to focus upon domestic issues also so as to ensure its public diplomacy image or efforts are not tarnished by internal human rights violations.
Sources:
Amnesty International, 'Qatar Human Rights: Human Rights Concerns' available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/all-countries/qatar/page.do?id=1011226
Human Rights Watch (January 2001), 'US Should Block Qatar Venue for WTO Meeting', http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2001/01/24/us-should-block-qatar-venue-wto-meeting
Human Rights in Ireland (December 2010), 'Qatar, the World Cup, Migrant Workers and Human Rights', http://www.humanrights.ie/index.php/2010/12/09/qatar-the-world-cup-migrant-workers-and-human-rights/
You Tube, AlJazeeraEnglish: 'Blood, Sweat and Tears' (August 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hMxbpsw_UTE
A very interesting piece on Qatar's niche diplomacy. Qatar seems to have realized exactly what its strengths and its possibilities are, and applied that to use for conflict mediation, to use all means that it has to influence and bring conflict parties together. A successful way therefore to get international recognition and more influence on the international arena, something that it would not otherwise necessarily have, due to its small size.
ReplyDeleteCouldn't have said it any better myself :)
ReplyDeleteThanks for posting this Rebecka I found it very interesting. It really highlights the ability of smaller states to use public diplomacy as a means by which to make itself a player at the international level. Although Qatar's strength's lie in the traditional diplomatic practices of negotiation and mediation, what it does by mastering this is promote a positive image of itself as an independent and disproportinately powerful player to other nations. Thus showing that traditional diplomacy and 'the new diplomacy' are not mutually exclusive, but in fact can complement each other well when used efficiently.
ReplyDeleteAlthough I agree with Jodi's point about internal human rights issues, it certainly seems as though Qatar have indeed found their niche and look set to continue to succeed as a result.
Jodi, you make a valid and important point about human rights abuses in Qatar. I certainly agree with you that these issues must be addressed. With that said, I don’t see how this is connected to Qatar’s niche diplomacy. Qatar’s credibility as a conflict mediator rests on its reputation as honest, trustworthy, non-aggressive as well as its ability to exert some leverage on the parties involved.
ReplyDeleteSusanna and Alex, thanks for your comments :)
Paul, thank you for stopping by, reading the blog and commenting :)
ReplyDeleteHi,Foreign investors are permitted a 49% stake in the business within company formation in Qatar, on condition that there is one or more Qatari partners.Thanks.....
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