
It is true that Qatar share many similarities with its immediate neighbours. Qatar hosts a significant number of guest workers in relation to its own small native population on a relatively small territory. In addition, it is an emirate and is rich in both oil and gas. However, unlike its neighbours on the initiative by Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani Qatar has pursued a very specific form of Public Diplomacy – namely Niche Diplomacy.
Niche Diplomacy can be defined as the concentration of “resources in specific areas best able to generate returns worth having” (Ungerer, 2007, p.548). Put differently, by selectively focusing efforts in one area, often for the greater good of the international community, states gain influence in international relations that is disproportionate to their size and role in the wider international community. As such, it allows small states to overcome the difficulty of yielding influence. In the case of Qatar, niche diplomacy is employed for two reasons. First, it is a calculated effort to achieve more influence on an international scale by gaining international recognition. Second, it is a survival mechanism in an unstable region with two competing powers – Saudi Arabia and Iran. (Rockower,2008)
So what is Qatar’s niche diplomacy? Conflict mediation. Yes, Qatar has proven to be a skillful mediator. Its niche diplomacy success rests primarily on three elements. First, the Emir has placed Qatar in a unique position by cultivating close ties to many diverse states and actors, often at odds with one another. While hosting an American military base and maintaining a close friendship to the US, Qatar has intimate relations with Iran. Furthermore, despite being a key supporter of Hamas, Qatar has informal ties to Israel. Qatar convenes continuous meetings with Hamas officials within its territory while simultaneously pushing for the Middle East to develop economic ties with Israel. (Cooper and Momani 2010)
Second, Qatar is perceived as honest and independent, free from the dominance of major regional and global players. This in part due to its close ties to a wide variety of actors as well as its boldness to speak out. Qatar has opposed economic sanctions of Israel, but also chose to expel Israel’s trade commission in Doha after the bombardments of Lebanon in 2006. Furthermore, it is also attributed to Qatar’s mere size- by definition as a small state Qatar is not viewed as a potential threat to others. (Abraham,2008 and Rockower,2008)
Third, as a result of its oil and gas resources, Qatar has the ability to influence mediation efforts by the use of financial means. For example Qatar invites different parties to a conflict (including what it is seen as the rebel” side) to Doha for negotiations- all expenses paid by Qatar. Furthermore, Qatar also engages in humanitarian and reconstruction efforts where large donations are made. Such generosity endows Qatar with both access and credibility. Thus, this form of “checkbook diplomacy” is often employed to back up mediation efforts pursued by Qatar. (Reuters,2010 and Rockower,2008)
Having had a mediator role in many conflicts including Yemen, Darfur, Western Sahara and within the Palestinian factions, Qatar had its breakthrough with Lebanon in 2008. At the time Lebanon was on the brink of a civil war because of the inability of various factions to agree on the choice of President. After 18 months of political deadlock where the US, France, Saudi Arabia and the Arab League had all attempted to mediate the conflict it was Qatar that saved Lebanon from yet another devastating civil war. Since the other mediators had a perceived bias towards various factions they were unable to gain the trust of all. Only Qatar, with recognised links to all of the parties involved was able to bring the Lebanese factions together. (Cooper and Momani, 2010 and Janardhan,2010)
In conclusion, Qatar has succeeded in its role as a mediator because it is perceived as honest and trustworthy, it has strong ties to antithetical actors and is able to back up any mediation efforts with its checkbook diplomacy. As a result, Qatar has become much more than just another oil-rich emirate in the Arabian-peninsula. Qatar has gained influence in the realms of the international diplomatic scene- and rightly so.
SOURCES:
Abraham, George(2008), “Qatar is a diplomatic heavy-hitter”, Al Jazeera, July 1, http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2008/07/200872164735567644.html
Cooper, Andrew F and Momani, Bessma(2010), “Qatar and expanded contours of Small State Diplomacy”, February, http://www.arts.uwaterloo.ca/~bmomani/documents/ISA2010-Qatar.pdf
Janardhan, Dr N.(2010), “Niche diplomacy gets Qatar to its goal”, The Khaleej Times, December 30, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=/data/opinion/2010/December/opinion_December142.xml§ion=opinion
Reuters(2010), “Wealthy Qatar tries to build niche as conflict mediator”, al-Masrya al-Youm, June 4, http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/46676
Rockower,Paul(2008), “Qatar’s Public Diplomacy”, December 12
Ungerer,Carl(2007), “The ‘Middle Power’ Concept in Australian Foreign Policy”, The Journal of Politics and History, vol.53,nr.4,p.538-551