China is given as transitioning through various forms of public and cultural diplomacy efforts, with the latest evident within a soft power capacity as illustrated by Joseph Nye’s works. Nye indicates that “threats of coercion (“sticks”); inducement or payments (“carrots”) and attraction” make others behave in desirable ways that allow for favourable outcomes for the soft power user (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 2008). While Nye is discussing China’s role within the 2008 Olympics and the subsequent success of the event for China’s global image, he indicates that soft power strategies have allowed for some 110, 000 foreign students to be enrolled in the country, 17 million visiting tourists per year, as well as over 200 Confucius Institutes to be established globally (ibid). Nye also highlights broadcasting efforts whereby China Radio International were now broadcasting in English 24 hours per day, compared to the Voice of America’s reduction in China from 19 to 14 hours daily. Such strategies can be seen to operate within the latter ‘attraction’ of Nye’s three illustrations of soft power, with Kurlantzick (2007) suggesting that Nye focuses on this aspect far more than ‘carrot’ or ‘stick’ methods and which he himself gives greater attention to, perceiving them as a crucial factor in China’s success so far.
Kurlantzick places greater emphasis on China’s use of carrot and stick strategies in developing countries as a means for gaining greater soft power success. In this manner China’s heightened presence in Thailand following the Asian Financial Crisis, when the US are given as largely withdrawing financial support, saw the spread of Chinese studies centres and consulates along with economic ties between China and Thailand. Kurlantzick refers to such practices as China’s ‘charm offensive’, although outlining that very little is actually known about their strategic approach and diplomatic methods, as well as extensive information regarding aid figures and how China’s soft power diplomacy is received by recipient citizens. A 2003 visit of then US President George Bush is said by Kurlantzick to have been received by a hostile public and parliamentary audience due to the American use of hard power in relation to the (then) recent invasion of Iraq. Whereas China’s President Hu Jinato’s subsequent visit is said to have received a warm welcome, with the leader spending longer in the country and the trip finalised by the signing a Free Trade Agreement with Australia, with the first round of negotiations taking place in May 2005 (http://www.dfat.gov.au/ 2011). Australia and China have a history of public and cultural diplomacy as represented by the 1978 introduction of the Australia-China Council (ACC), designed to “promote mutual understanding and foster people-to-people relations” (ibid). The ACC offers grants and funding opportunities for various schemes that are associated with promoting the Council’s aims, operating via institutions or individuals in areas such as education, economics and cultural sharing, including student exchange programs.
China’s inclination toward “coercive economic and diplomatic levers like aid and investment” (Kurlantzick 2007: 6) are seen as outside of the traditional soft power approach, which Nye perceives as geared more toward the promotion of a positive value base, leading to nation-branding attractiveness, and can perhaps be seen in the context of overseas volunteers or academic exchange programs, something in which China is becoming increasingly involved with. In this context China’s soft power approach can be seen to include “anything outside of the military and security realm” (ibid). China is keen to promote an image of a ‘peaceful rise’ as represented by its engagement with the UN and ASEAN to utilise diplomatic measures, with the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties and Treaty of Amity demonstrating the progression from maritime disputes over the South China Sea between China, Vietnam and the Philippines (http://www.clingendael.nl/ 2010). Nye (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 2008) outlines how China carried out regional soft power strategies initially and, with successes in this area, moved its attention globally within a cultural diplomacy context. The “Voyage of Chinese Culture to Africa” and “China-Africa Youth Festival” in 2004, as well as the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) in 2000 can all be given as examples of public and cultural diplomacy with the intent of increasing relations, dialogue and economic ties (http://www.chinese-embassy.org.za/ 2004). China has been keen to market historic exploration to the Middle East, Africa and Asia by Zheng He and Cheng Ho as “encountering but never conquering other nations” (Kurlantzick 2007: 62). China’s more recent involvement in developing countries (especially within Africa) whereby aid is given without restrictions, unlike the imposed conditionality’s of Western aid providers and further perpetuates the ‘peaceful’ image China wishes to portray.
China has, however, come under heavy criticism for its apparent involvement in the supply of arms that helped fuel the 2008 conflict in Darfur, despite a UN arms embargo. The BBC’s Panorama programme reported the use of Chinese supplied tanks and armaments, as well as training given to pilots of Chinese A5 Fantan fighter jets (http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/ 2008). China was said to have not publically responded to the Panorama allegations and had previously spoken of its strong economic ties with Sudan (China is the main purchases of Sudan’s oil) and that the country needed support in the form of business partners, development and peaceful relations with Darfur, instead of “confrontation and sanctions from the West” (ibid). In this manner China’s soft power can be seen to ignore numerous human rights violations, both at home and when dealing with global trading partners and exposes a darker, economically-focused strategy that turns a blind eye to a country’s domestic issues in return for almost exclusive trading rights. In this manner, Nye is keen to outline how the US is still (at the time of the article in 2008) perceived as the dominant soft power user and that China should now focus on “free expression” within the country in order to continue their efforts of global acceptance and legitimacy as a superpower state (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 2008). Nye also indicates that soft power can, and usually is, conducted by both state and non-state actors but that China, with its controlling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), all too often operates at the state level and carefully constructs the image portrayed to the outside world.
It has been noted, however, that the US are mistrusting China’s ability to rise peacefully and some argue that “history and international relations theory shows that tensions and war are often associated with the rise of a new great power” (Jentleson 2007: 322). China is also given as the only country whose missiles target the US (Segal in Buzan and Foot 2005) and its more recent move toward military development is somewhat suspiciously observed by the US. Although, China is given as spending (US) $80 billion annually and, compared to the US amount of $400 billion per year, is not a significant threat to US security (Kurlantzick 2007). Theorists such as Buzan (2009) have indicated that there is a difficulty in distinguishing between offensive and defensive military strategies as the procurement of arms, for either purpose leads to a fear of attack and “...in the process of providing various forms of security, insecurities are also reproduced” (Dalby in Krause and Williams 1997: 13).
Hence, China can be seen as following all appropriate frameworks that favour regional stability, the promotion of public and cultural diplomacy and are also working hard to ensure that their rise is not perceived as a threat to the prevailing status quo. China’s continued economic growth and ability to align itself with developed and developing countries alike sees that its utilisation of soft power has not only been deemed a success, but has led to a debate over ‘the Washington Consensus versus the Beijing Consensus’ (in Africa) in relation to the best economic model for development. However, China’s main criticism and subsequent limitation surrounds the inability of the CCP to loosen the grip of state control and, as Nye has suggested, China requires greater concentration on domestic freedoms in order to sustain and expand its global aims, which are inherently based (for now at least) on economic domination and increased global cooperation.
Sources:
·Anderson, H., ‘China is fuelling war in Darfur’, 13 July 2008, BBC News, available as of 9 April 2011 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7503428.stm
·‘Australia-China Council’, Australian Government: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, available as of 8 April 2011 at http://www.dfat.gov.au/acc/index.html
·‘Australia-China Free Trade Agreement Negotiations’, Australian Government: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, available as of 8 April 2011 at http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/acfta/
·Buzan, B. and Foot, R., Does China Matter? A Reassessment: Essays in memory of Gerald Segal, Routledge 2004, Oxon
·Buzan, B., People, States and Fear (2nd edition): an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era, ECPR Press 2009, Colchester
·Dalby, S., ‘From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies’ in Krause, K. and Williams, M., Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, UCL Press Ltd 1997, London
·‘Exchanges between China and Africa’, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of South Africa, available as of 10 April 2011 at http://www.chinese-embassy.org.za/eng/znjl/t177585.html
·Jentleson, W., American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century (3rd edition), Norton and Company. Inc. 2007, London
·Kurlantzick, J., Charm offensive: how China’s soft power is transforming the world’, Yale University 2007, New York
·Nye, J., ‘The Olympics and Chinese Soft Power’ 24 August 2008, The Huffington Post, available as of 4 April 2011 at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-nye/the-olympics-and-chinese_b_120909.html
·‘The rise of China: setting alarm bells ringing?’, Clingendael: Netherlands Institute for International Relations, The Newsletter, No. 53, Spring 2010, available as of 10 April 2011 at http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2010/20100301_ciep_review_bbuijs.pdf
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